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RITUAL, TIME, AND ETERNITY 
by Roy A .  Rappaport 
Abstract. It is argued here that the construction of time and 
eternity are among ritual’s entailments. In dividing continuous 
duration into distinct periods ritual distinguishes two temporal 
conditions: (1) that prevailing in mundane periods and (2) that 
prevailing during the intervals between them. Differences in the 
frequency, length, and relationship among the rituals constituting 
different liturgical orders are considered, as are differences between 
mundane periods and ritual’s intervals with respect to social rela- 
tions, cognitive modes, meaningfulness, and typical interactive 
frequencies. Periods, it is observed, relate to intervals as ever- 
changing to never-changing, and close relationships of never- 
changing to eternity, eternity to sanctity, and sanctity to truth are 
proposed. In the argument that ritual’s “times out of time” really 
are outside mundane time, similarities to the operations of digital 
computers and Herbert Simon’s discussion of interaction frequen- 
cies in the organization of matter are noted. 
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I shall be concerned with the ways in which time and eternity are 
organized by ritual. Because this discussion is part of a more general 
one concerning the entailments of the ritual form, some introductory 
remarks locating it in its larger context will be helpful. 
I take the term ritual to denote the performance of more or less invariant 
sequences of formal acts and utterances not encoded by the performers. This 
definition is devoid of any functional or substantive stipulations, 
neither asserting what ritual is “made of’  nor stating what it does. 
It is, rather, formal or structural in nature, taking enduring rela- 
tions among the features that lead us to identify events as rituals 
-formality, invariance, performance, encoding by other than per- 
formers-to be definitive. 
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These features may be obvious in the sense that they are directly 
perceptible, but they and the complex relations prevailing among 
them have less obvious entailments. I have, to begin with, argued 
at length elsewhere (1979a) that participation in a ritual signifies, 
not symbolically but indexically, the acceptance of whatever is represented 
symbolically in that ritual. I cannot develop this matter fully here. 
Suffice it to note the following: 
T o  perform a liturgical order (or ritual), by definition a more or 
less invariant sequence of acts and utterances specified by authorities 
other than the performers themselves, is perforce to conform to it. It 
follows that authority is intrinsic to ritual. But the relationship of 
performers to the orders they perform is more intimate and binding 
than such terms as authority and conformity suggest. Rituals are com- 
posed, as we have noted, of acts and utterances. The orders encoded 
in them are enlivened or realized-made into res-only when those 
acts are performed and those utterances are voiced. This relationship 
of the act of performance to that which is performed-that the per- 
formance brings the order performed into being once again-cannot 
help but establish as well the relationship of the performer to that 
which he or she is performing. Performers are not merely transmit- 
ting messages they find encoded in the ritual’s canon to themselves 
and, possibly, to others. They are participating in-that is to say, 
becoming parts of-the orders to which their bodies and breaths give 
life. 
That ritual is a mode of communication is a truism among its 
secular students, but they have not always paid sufficient attention 
to the significance of its semiological or semiotic peculiarities. We 
need only touch upon certain of them here. The notion of com- 
munication implies, minimally, transmitters, receivers, messages, 
and channels. That, in ritual’s channel, senders and receivers are 
often one and the same has already been implied. Indeed, per- 
formers, as transmitters of messages they themselves did not encode, will 
always be among the most significant receivers of those messages. 
We may also note a further fusion: in performing a ritual the 
transmitter-receiver becomes fused with the message he or she is 
transmitting and receiving. As already suggested, in conforming 
to the order that comes alive through their performance the per- 
formers become parts of that order, and thus indistinguishable from it, 
for the time being. For participants to reject an order enlivened by 
their participation while they are participating in it would be self- 
contradictory. Therefore, in performing a ritual the participants accept, and 
indicate to themselves and to others that they accept, the order encoded in that 
ritual. 
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Acceptance of an order may be a consequence of belief in it, but 
acceptance does not require such belief. Belief is an inward state 
knowable, if at all, only to the believer. Acceptance, in contrast, is 
a public act, visible both to the acceptor and to others. Nor does 
acceptance guarantee future compliance with whatever rules- 
social, moral, or devotional-that the accepted order encodes. Ritual 
acceptance is, nevertheless, binding in that it establishes obligations to 
act in ways conforming to the accepted order. It is obviously possible 
to violate one’s obligations. Less obviously, it can be argued that one 
cannot violate obligations that have not been accepted, because there 
are no obligations in the absence of acceptance (Searle 1969, 189).’ 
Obligations are accepted in, through, and by participation in ritual, 
which is to say that social contract is intrinsic to the form that con- 
stitutes ritual. Furthermore, inasmuch as breach of obligation is 
always and everywhere regarded as immoral, and may even be 
the essence of all acts taken to be immoral, morality is intrinsic to 
ritual. 
I have further argued elsewhere that the concept of the sacred, 
the sense of the numinous, and the notion of the divine are also 
products of ritual, and that the ritual form is at least isomorphic with 
a widespread paradigm of creation (1979a). I shall now suggest 
ways in which conceptions of eternity are also implicit in ritual, and 
propose ways in which liturgical orders construct temporal orders 
composed of alternations of time and eternity. 
LITURGICAL ORDERS AND THEIR DIMENSIONS 
I use the term liturgical order to refer not only to individual rituals, but 
also to the more or less invariant sequences of rituals that make up 
cycles and other sorts of series. Although my terminology differs from 
that of Van Gennep (1909), my usage is similar to his, for he too was 
at least as concerned with such sequences as he was with single 
rituals. 
I refer to rituals and sequences of rituals as liturgical orders 
because I take them to be orders in virtually every sense of the word. 
First, they constitute orders in the sense of “systems,” as exemplified 
in such phrases as “the moral order” or “the economic order” or 
“the natural order”-more or less coherent domains within which 
generally commensurable processes are governed by common prin- 
ciples and rules. As such they constitute order, as opposed to disorder 
or chaos. In doing so they may distinguish orders of persons-for 
instance, those “in orders” (such as Benedictine monks) from others. 
These orders may be ranked, and rank or hierarchy is implicit in 
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some usages. Architects, for instance, speak of elaborate arches 
composed of four or five orders, one above the other. Further, inas- 
much as liturgical orders are more or less invariant sequences 
encoded by other than the performers their performance entails 
conformity. This is to say that, although their words may not be cast 
in the imperative mood, they constitute orders in the directive sense. 
Finally and most obviously, they are orders in that they are more or 
less fixed sequences of acts and utterances, following each other “in 
order. ” 
We are led here to the dimensions, analogous to the length, 
breadth, and height of rooms, in which liturgical orders are realized. 
The first and most obviously temporal, which may be likened to 
the length of a chamber, is the sequential dimension. As rooms vary in 
length, so do liturgical orders. Some rituals are fleeting, some fill 
hours or days; it is common for liturgical orders to mark years, and 
it is not unusual for them to organize yet more protracted durations. 
Long or short, all “take time,” as we say, time during which one act 
or utterance, or one ritual, succeeds the one preceding it in estab- 
lished order. Although nothing might seem more banal than the 
observation that one thing follows another, the implications of one 
thing following another are not all obvious or banal, as Van Gennep 
long ago showed us. 
If the sequential dimension can be likened to the length of a 
chamber, the second, which we may call the synchronic, can be likened 
to that chamber’s breadth. At each successive moment during a 
ritual’s performance an array of varied significata may be concurrently 
represented to participants by single objects or acts. Conversely, 
a single significatum may be concurrently represented by a plethora 
of simultaneously performed acts or perceived objects. An example 
of the latter is Carnival (Babcock 1973), during which overwhelm- 
ing arrays of acts and objects simultaneously signify the same 
thing: inversion. A famous instance of the former is provided by 
the Ndembu people’s Mudyi tree, for which Victor Turner identi- 
fied nineteen simultaneously represented significata (Turner 1967; 
1973). The general meaning or significance of the Mudyi tree, we 
may note in passing, is not the sum of these more or less distinct 
significata but a product of their union in a single, instantaneously 
grasped “sign” or “representamen” (Peirce 1955). This dimension, 
which is emphasized in symbolic analyses of “multivocal” ritual 
signs, is also variable. Some of the acts and objects constituting any 
liturgical order represent broader or narrower arrays of significata 
than others. Some bring together meanings from all varieties of 
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experience, others are more highly focused, and the breadth of a 
ritual may vary from moment to moment as its performance pro- 
gresses. The synchronic dimension, like the sequential, has a 
temporal aspect, constituting a continuous “now” in the movement, 
intrinsic to all successions and sequences, of future to past. 
The third dimension, the hierarchical, which may be likened to the 
height of our analogic chamber, has received less attention and is 
less well understood than the others. The matter is difficult and 
complex. There is time here to do little more than note that all rituals 
and ritual elements are not equivalent in import. Some rituals, to 
begin with, are both instrumental and contingent upon others, which 
are taken to be fundamental. For instance, politically instrumental 
coronation ceremonies in Catholic kingdoms are contingent upon 
another ritual, the Mass, whose fundamental office is to accept the 
divinity of the God in whose name the king is to be crowned. 
Hierarchical relations of contingency may be several levels deep. The 
efficacy of the ritual for curing the disease called the King’s Evil 
(scrofula), in which Catholic kings healed sufferers by touching 
them, was, in turn, contingent upon the anointment of the king’s 
hands in the coronation ceremony. Such hierarchical relations of 
contingency point to hierarchical relations of sanctity. Some 
elements of liturgical orders are ultimately sacred while others are 
merely sanctified by association with the ultimately sacred. Thus, the 
Jewish statement of faith, called the Shema (“Hear, 0 Israel, the 
Lord our God the Lord is One”) postulates the ultimately sacred, 
whereas the 613 commandments in the Torah are not ultimately 
sacred but merely sanctified by association with the ultimate sacred 
postulate. Elsewhere (1979b, 117ff.), in dealing with the matter 
at greater length I have argued that the multiple understandings 
represented in and organized by liturgical orders differ not only with 
respect to relations of contingency and degrees of sanctity, but, 
correspondingly, with respect to authority, logical typing, the ways 
in which they are meaningful, and along several other continua: 
from highly general to highly specific, abstract to concrete, absolutely 
irreversible to easily reversible, absolutely immutable to highly 
labile, and perduring to evanescent. The last of these continua indi- 
cates that the hierarchical dimension has temporal characteristics, 
to which we shall later return. This essay will, however, be mainly 
concerned with aspects of sequence. Whereas Van Gennep was 
primarily concerned with the social transformations effected in 
ritual’s times, we will be primarily concerned with temporal orga- 
nization itself. 
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THE CONSTRUCTION OF TIME 
Time is mysterious, and will remain so long after the words of this 
discussion have been absorbed into the silence of an ever-retreating 
past. I will simply note that anthropologists and psychologists (Hall 
1984; Ornstein 1969) tend to agree that, although various “biologi- 
cal clocks” exist, there seems to be no universal temporal sense 
guiding all humans through the durations of their lives at apparently 
similar rates. It would, on the other hand, be an exaggeration to 
claim that the sense of time is fully constructed ex nihilo by each 
culture for itself, for all normal humans (past infancy) must dis- 
tinguish, at least during the waking state, now from past and future, 
and-pace Edmund Leach (1961, 126)-past and future from each 
other as well. They also perceive some events to be further in the past 
or future than others, and they recognize that although some sorts of 
events are periodic and recurrent, others are not. 
The chronicles of memory and anticipation are, however, private 
and idiosyncratic, and they may be bent or reordered by regret, 
nostalgia, pain, delight, foreboding, and hope-or disarranged by 
disease, age, and simple forgetfulness. The sense of passage that 
all normal humans possess, being idiosyncratic and unreliable, or 
at least subject to distortion, not only cannot serve as the ground 
for temporal ordering, but may even create a demand for public 
ordering. All societies, in consequence, are faced with the task of 
constructing time, not simply for the coordination of social life but 
to provide roads for each individual’s temporal experience to follow. 
Nature is a source of temporal raw material, and societies may, of 
course, found time upon the periodicities of nature; but this does not 
propose that human time is simply natural. While it may be founded 
upon natural processes-the circle of the seasons, the waxing and 
waning of the moon, the alternation of day and night-it is not 
established by those processes themselves. It is of interest that the 
only natural cycle that seems universally significant is that of day 
and night. Although cultures may make use of a range of natural 
cyclicities in their construction of time, time needs always to be 
constructed. The materials out of which it is constructed, moreover, 
are not limited to natural recurrences. There are olympiads, five-day 
“weeks,” seven-day “weeks,” nine-day “weeks,” and ritual cycles of 
variable duration, such as that of the Maring of highland Papua New 
Guinea, which takes anywhere from eight to twenty or so years to 
come full circle (Rappaport 1968). 
Aristotle (Physics, bk. 4, chap. 10, in McKeon 1941), and many 
since Aristotle, have suggested that the experience of time and, 
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indeed, time itself, is fundamentally a matter of succession, recurrent 
or nonrecurrent. Whitehead (1929, 158) took it to be the “sheer 
succession of epochal durations”; a little earlier in the century J. S. 
Mackenzie (1912), in a discussion of eternity, defined it as “simply 
the form of succession in a developing process.” 
This may sound clear, but succession of what? When we speak of 
successions we must be speaking of more or less distinct events or 
states of affairs. But what is “a  state of affairs” or “an event”? Each 
of us interprets the occurrences we separately experience in more or 
less idiosyncratic ways, and each of us punctuates continuous 
experience differently. Furthermore, even such natural transitions as 
spring turning into summer are vague, for nature does not mark such 
transitions sharply. Most natural processes are continuous rather 
than discontinuous, and continuity generates both vagueness and 
ambiguity. 
The formal characteristics of ritual contrast sharply with the 
indistinct character of “natural” events. Rituals are more or less 
invariant from one performance to the next, and great emphasis is 
often placed upon punctiliousness of performance. This is to say 
that they are among the most perfectly recurrent of cultural events. 
As such, the fact of a ritual’s occurrence-that is, that a ritual is, in 
fact, occurring-is among the clearest of all humanly constructed 
events. 
Clarity of occurrence suits ritual admirably for the task of impos- 
ing on natural processes discontinuities much sharper than those 
intrinsic to the natural processes themselves. It may even be claimed 
that the occurrence of ritual imposes discontinuities upon processes 
that are themselves seamlessly continuous. As such, ritual can be 
relied upon to distinguish succeeding from preceding unambigu- 
ously, thus distinguishing, in continuous processes, what may be 
called phases-that is, stages-in what can now appear as series of 
distinct states of affairs. These phases-whether parts of “develop- 
mental” or recurrent processes-may then serve as characteriza- 
tions of the durations during which they unfold and, in effect, 
transform those durations into periodr. Periods, to put it conversely, 
are temporal durations within which phases are encompassed- 
such phases as springlsummerlautumn/winter, childhoodlyouthl 
manhoodldeath, nightlday. Thus, through the series of rituals com- 
prising them, liturgical orders sever seamless durations into distinct 
periods and may also invest those periods with significance. More- 
over, as liturgical orders distinguish periods from one another, so 
may they unite them into larger, meaningful entities. Childhood, 
youth, manhood, and old age are joined into coherent and orderly 
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lifetimes, and spring, summer, autumn, and winter into years. If, 
as MacKenzie said, in general agreement with many others, time is 
“simply the form of succession in a .  . . process” (1912)-developing 
or otherwise-then liturgical orders impose form on processes to 
make succession. There can be no succession without things- 
periods-to succeed each other. It is of interest that the English word 
time derives from the Indo-European root di, or dai, “to divide” 
(American Heritage Dictionary 1969, 151 1). In dividing continuous 
duration into distinct periods, liturgy provides the wherewithal of 
succession and further provides for those successions to be joined into 
larger wholes. This is the beginning of temporal construction. 
But only the beginning. No ritual is instantaneous. The ritual of, 
say, Midsummer Night’s Eve lasts from dusk until dawn, thereby 
comprising a duration of sensible length. This duration is neither in 
the preceding springtime nor the succeeding summer but constitutes 
a significant interval between those periods. In distinguishing periods 
from each other, liturgy cannot help but distinguish periods as a class 
from the intervals separating them as a class. These intervals may be 
confined within boundaries of single rituals, or they may be more 
protracted, beginning and ending with distinct rituals; and complex 
patterns of nesting are also common. 
The distinction between intervals and the periods they separate 
corresponds to a frequently remarked distinction between two kinds 
of time, or, to be a little more formal and correct, two “tempo- 
ral conditions.” O n  the one hand, what is called “ordinary” or 
“mundane,” or “profane” time prevails in periods, but intervalic 
“time” is said to be different. Mysterious phrases, such as “extra- 
ordinary” or “sacred” time, or even “time out of time,” are used. 
Van Gennep (1960), Turner (1967; 1969), Leach (1961), Wallace 
(1966), and others have been concerned with the peculiar charac- 
teristics of actions and events occurring in these liminal intervals, 
emphasizing that transitions are effected in them and that neither 
quotidian logic nor ordinary social relations prevail during them. 
We shall return later to these matters and also to something with 
which they were not importantly concerned, namely, the peculiar 
characteristics of extraordinary time itself. I will argue that “time out 
of time” really is out of time. 
There is something, however, to say about this now. It is of interest 
that in distinguishing two temporal conditions from each other, 
ordinary periodic time and extraordinary intervalic time, liturgical 
orders operate in a manner that bears a striking formal resemblance 
to the operation of digital computers. The introduction to a text- 
book on circuit design tells us that “the successful operation of a real 
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machine depends upon being able to separate the time intervals at 
which variables have their desired values from those in which they are 
changing. Logically, therefore, the passage of time is discrete where 
physically it is cont inu~us’~ (Reeves 1972). 
Before and after the moment of change the variables have their 
“desired values,” which is to say the values that enter into the 
machine’s computations. The intervals during which the values of 
variables are actually changing are outside the times during which 
the computer’s operant logic prevails and are ignored in its com- 
putations. But although the processes of change are ignored in the 
machine’s computations, the values of the variables that do enter into 
the computations are contingent upon those changes. 
The logic of the machine, in sum, is digital. Computations take 
the values of components to be either 0 or 1. The transiJion from 0 
to 1, taking place in  the ignored interval, is not a digital but an analogical 
process. This is to say that the processes in the intervals are governed 
by a logic other than that in which computation proceeds. 
The resemblance to ritual seems patent. As the values of variables 
in computers are contingent upon transformations in preceding 
intervals, so are social states in mundane periods in some degree 
outcomes of transformations in previous rituals, and while the states 
of affairs before and after ritual transformations can be distinguished 
by the digital logic of either/or (e.g., singlelmarried, youth/man, 
wadpeace), the logic of the interval, when transformation is actually 
effected, is that of neithednor and analogical. 
There are, of course, differences between computers and liturgical 
orders, one of the most obvious being duration. Intervals in com- 
puters were first measured in milliseconds, then microseconds, and 
now nanoseconds (billionths of seconds), and the analogical processes 
in them are of the temporal order of picoseconds (thousandths of 
billionths of seconds). The intervals marked by liturgical orders 
are, in contrast, hours, or even days, and occasionally weeks or 
months in length. They are always long enough to experience being 
in them. We shall return to this later; first, however, there is more 
to say about periods themselves, about the relationship of intervals 
to periods, and about what may be called “the shapes” of liturgical 
orders. 
RECURRENCE AND NONRECURRENCE 
To speak of the construction of time by ritual is, in part, to speak of 
its shaping in conformity to the shapes or forms of liturgical orders. 
There are, first, what Van Gennep called “rectilinear orders” 
14 Zyfon 
(1960), exemplified by the sequences of rites leading from those 
surrounding birth to those following death. Although the prepon- 
derance of the rituals composing such sequences may be, for any 
individual, nonrecurrent, they are oft repeated in any society, for 
many or most of its members will proceed through them. 
There are also “closed” or recurrent orders-those that lead back, 
so to speak, whence they came. Cycles are familiar, and many 
liturgical orders, most obviously calendrical orders, take a “circular” 
form. Recurrence can, however, assume other shapes. In speaking 
of time generally, Edmund Leach proposed some years ago (1961, 
126) that alternation, rather than cyclicity, is the form that recur- 
rence takes in stateless societies, and even in archaic states. Leach’s 
assertion was in some degree an expression of disagreement with 
Evans-Pritchard’s facile assumption (1940, 95ff.) that recurrence 
virtually entails cyclicity, but the opposition between cyclicity and 
alternation as competing grounds of recurrence seems hardly worth 
fighting about. For one thing, an alternation is a cycle, albeit of the 
simplest possible sort, that is, one consisting of only two phases or 
states. It could be argued, of course, that even though alternation can 
be subsumed logically by cyclicity, they are experientially different. 
Even granted this, why should it be necessary to choose one or the 
other as fundamental? The matter is not of great importance but is 
worth bringing up for this reason: whereas the succession of periods 
may be either alternating or cyclical (e.g., as in alternations between 
war and peace on the one hand and the cycle of the four seasons 
on the other), the relationship of periods to intervals is intrinsically 
alternating. 
Whatever the recurrence structure of mundane time may be, 
overall temporal structure, when constituted by a liturgical order, 
is an alternation between mundane time and “time out of time.” 
It is important to note again, now with respect to this alternation 
between the temporal conditions, that rituals, which distinguish and 
encompass times out of time, are, as invariant sequences of formal 
acts and utterances in which emphasis is typically placed on punc- 
tilious performance, among the most perfectly recurrent of social 
events. 
Recurrence is not confined to ritual, of course. Much of what 
occurs in mundane time is also recurrent. Spring comes every 
year. But mundane time is also the time to which the continuous, 
oriented, and nonrecurrent processes of nature are largely confined 
-the irreversible changes of growth and progress, to be sure, but 
also those of decline and death. The ceaseless and ineluctable changes 
of life and history are of mundane time. 
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In contrast, that which occurs in liturgical time out of time is 
characterized by punctilious repetition and is thus represented as neuer- 
changing. The relationship, then, of that which occurs in liturgical 
intervals to that which occurs in mundane periods is the relationship 
of the never-changing to the euer-changing. We shall return to this, but 
first there are some things to say about the organization of mundane 
time. 
THE ORGANIZATION OF MUNDANE TIME 
If history and death are of mundane time, so, we have noted, are the 
recurrent processes that sustain life and society. We cannot take up 
the full range of ways in which liturgy orders the periodicities of 
mundane time but can only note some possibilities for, and entail- 
ments of, such ordering. 
We have already seen that liturgical orders may differ in shape. 
They also may differ in length. Some are elastic-as variable as the 
lengths of the lifetimes they mark at beginning and end or, as among 
the Maring of New Guinea, as variable as the amount of time it takes 
to acquire a sufficient number of pigs to perform the sacrifices 
necessary to conclude them. Others are precisely a year in length; 
some take one day, or seven days, or nine days, or a month. 
All of this is obvious, but less obvious things lie just below the 
surface of these apparently unremarkable facts. The recurrences 
marked by some liturgical orders are external to themselves. They 
are properties of processes unfolding independent of liturgy. The 
moon waxes and wanes regardless of ritual. The recurring ritual 
may make it clear that at a given moment summer has overtaken 
spring, but the liturgical calendar does not itself engender the con- 
tinuous changes in light, temperature, plant growth, animal sex- 
uality, or celestial movement upon which the distinction it makes is 
imposed. 
In other instances, however, the liturgical order itself provides 
the groundr of recurrence. In contrast to rituals that, let us say, greet 
the arrival of the new moon, Sabbath rituals do not simply reflect 
a rhythm intrinsic to nature upon social life. They provide an arbi- 
trary periodicity in accordance with which society can organize its 
activities. 
Of yet greater interest are noncalendrical liturgical cycles. The 
occurrences of the rituals constituting the Maring ritual cycle are 
a function of certain environmental and demographic processes. 
But this liturgical order does not simply reflect these processes, nor 
does it merely provide an arbitrary periodicity in terms of which 
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humans may organize management of them. It itself reverses and 
imposes recurrence upon them (Rappaport 1968, 153ff.). 
This is a matter of considerable importance. To  say that ritual 
imposes recurrence upon those processes is another way of saying 
that it regulates them. To regulate, in its very cybernetic essence, is 
to maintain the reversibility, and thus the recurrence, of processes 
that, if left to themselves, would move rectilinearly in the direction 
toward which the second law of thermodynamics points: toward 
environmental degradation, social disruption, political anarchy, and 
even biological annihilation. 
Discussion of the imposition of the cyclicity inherent in liturgical 
orders upon the social and natural world external to them leads from 
the ordering of time per se to the closely related matter of scheduling, 
that is, to the temporal organization of activities. 
First we may observe that those whose activities are organized by 
a common set of liturgical performances may form social entities of 
some sort. Indeed, such coordination may define social groups. 
Maring local groups are, in fact, distinguished from their neighbors 
by the coordination of the ritual cycles of their constituent clans. The 
history of their fusion from congeries of autonomous descent groups 
is a history of such coordination (Rappaport 1968). 
Conversely, significant social distinctions may be established and 
maintained by adoption of and conformity to distinct liturgical 
calendars. Familiar examples are provided by differences in the holy 
days of the Jews (Saturday), Christians (Sunday), and Muslims 
(Friday). The history of early Christianity suggests that the change 
to Sunday may well have been part of a deliberate attempt to dis- 
tinguish Christianity from Judaism, and it is probable that the obser- 
vance of Sunday by Christians began among the predominantly 
gentile congregations established by Paul, who urged his followers to 
protest against having the Sabbath imposed upon them. Congrega- 
tions composed mainly of persons of Jewish origin were slower to 
abandon Saturday for Sunday observance (Glazebrook 1921). The 
Muslim choice of Friday may also have been polemical (Margoliouth 
1918). 
The Quartodeciman heresy may be of even greater interest in the 
present context. The Quartodecimans-the first (or among the first) 
in Christianity’s history to be anathematized-were those who 
celebrated Easter on the fourteenth day of the Hebrew month of 
Nissan, which is Passover. A few years before the year 200, Victor, 
bishop of Rome, anathematized them as “those who would celebrate 
Easter with the Jews” (Carleton 1910). Subsequently, the date of 
Easter was reckoned in ways so that it could not coincide with 
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Passover. It can be argued that the adoption of anti-Quartodeciman 
reckoning marked the full separation of Christianity from Judaism 
-setting the stage, by the way, for the Irish, Greek, and Roman 
churches to separate themselves from each other, also on the grounds 
of Easter’s dating. 
To return to the coordination of activities per se, liturgy’s effects 
in this domain are most obvious and most significant when the 
cyclicities of the liturgical order are independent of seasonality. The 
Maring ritual cycle, which takes eight to twenty years to complete, 
is a good example. A sequence of rituals distinguishes a number of 
major periods, in each of which the dominant activity is different 
from the activities constituting the foci of the preceding and succeed- 
ing periods: 
1. Planting rumbim terminates warfare and commences a period of 
six to twenty years during which gardening and pig husbandry 
are the foci of activities. 
2. Planting stakes commences a period of several months during 
which trapping and smoking marsupials are the main activities. 
3. Uprooting the rumbin commences the kaiko festival, a little more 
than a year in length, during which pigs are sacrificed to 
ancestors, friendly groups are entertained, payments are made 
to affines, and alliances are strengthened. 
4. The pabe ritual terminates the kaiko and permits the local group 
to initiate warfare again, should its members wish to do so. 
The Maring cycle, it is clear, not only coordinates production, 
exchange, and defense, it also provides all of these activities, or 
rather these activities taken together, with a rationale that goes 
beyond their immediate material effects. Ancestors and allies alike 
are repaid, the dead are avenged, and ever again the wounds of a 
world sundered by inevitable human strife are healed in accordance 
with Nomane, a Maring conception that bears a family resemblance 
to the Heraclitean conception of Logos.2 
In light of this account it could be said that the ritual cycle con- 
stitutes, or at least codifies, relations of production in Maring society. 
By “relations of production” I mean the social relations organizing 
the material processes of production and the disposition of that which 
is produced. It is, as such, the locus of the assumptions in terms of 
which economizing behavior is organized and morality judged in that 
society. We can, I think, speak of a “ritual mode of production” in 
the Maring case. The ritual mode of production is probably confined 
to egalitarian societies. Because it can operate in the absence of dis- 
crete authorities, it is likely to be extremely ancient. 
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THE FREQUENCY AND LENGTH OF RITUALS 
Liturgical sequences differ not only in shape, length, and the bases 
for the occurrence of their constituent rituals, but also in the 
frequency of the rituals composing them, in the regularity of their 
occurrence, and in the length of individual rites. Catholic monastics 
daily recite the “offices,” seven rituals ancillary to the Mass; 
Orthodox Jews pray at least three times daily. In contrast, months 
or even years may pass between one community-wide Maring ritual 
and the next. Moreover, the occurrences of the latter are not 
calendrical. When they occur, however, they tend to be lengthy-all 
night is usual; some take three days. Anthropologists have paid little 
attention to these matters, and there is space here for no more than 
brief and tentative suggestions. 
First, the frequency of rituals may be related to the degree to which 
the liturgical order attempts, as it were, not only to regulate daily 
behavior, but to penetrate to the motivational bases of that behavior. 
This may, in turn, be related to the degree to which the conventions 
or moral dicta the rituals encode are vulnerable to violations moti- 
vated by the pressures and temptations of daily life, and to the weak- 
ness or absence of other means for dealing with them. Thus, the 
frequency of ritual participation on the part of Roman Catholic 
clergy may be related to the austerity of restrictions upon their sexual 
behavior, that of Orthodox Jews to the maintenance of their social 
boundaries in societies in which they are small minorities and in 
which assimilation has its temptations. High frequency-to push this 
a little further-may be instrumental in rooting whatever dicta are 
encoded in the ritual so continually and routinely in everyday life 
that they seem to be natural, or at least of “second nature,’’ rather 
than merely moral. To abandon them, if this is the case, would be 
painfully self-alienating. 
In contrast, the infrequent community-wide rituals of the Maring 
are not so much implicated in the regulation of daily behavior, let 
alone the emotional and motivational bases of that behavior, as they 
are with processes we would take to be “political.” In the absence of 
discrete authorities that are able to command the performances of 
others, these rituals, as we have seen, coordinate and effect transi- 
tions from one dominant community-wide activity, such as war, to 
another, husbandry. 
Suggestions concerning the social and psychological functions of 
high frequencies of ritual performance should not lead us to dismiss 
their eschatological significance. The punctuation of daily life by 
the brief but frequent rituals and the continuing observance of the 
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prescriptions constituting Halakah represent an attempt by Orthodox 
Jews to realize divine order in the mundane world. Such an attempt, 
to bring the divine into this world, is, says Soloveitchik (1963, 17ff.), 
the inverse of mystical attempts to escape from this world to unite 
with the divine. 
We are led by Soloveitchik from the frequency of rituals to their 
length. Mystical experiences (in a broad sense) may be encouraged 
by, or evoked in, less frequent rituals of greater length and intensity. 
To put it in the converse, the length of rituals could be related to the 
profundity of the transformations to be effected in them. Longer 
intervals allow fuller development of the peculiar characteristics of 
times out of time, resulting, possibly, in deeper transformations of 
consciousness and longer-lasting effects upon the psyches of the 
participants. In terms of this suggestion we might expect rites of 
passage in societies with radically demarcated ontogenetic statuses to 
be long. There may, of course, be alternatives to length for reach- 
ing psychic depths in such rites. Pain could be one. Among Aus- 
tralian aborigines, for whom the distinction between the initiated and 
uninitiated is sharp and wide, rites of passage are both long and 
painful. 
Finally, we may note that there are liturgical orders in which the 
constituent rituals are both long and frequent. The proportion of 
time spent in ritual becomes very high and the times between ritual 
so short that the emotional afterglow of one has not fully faded before 
another commences. Such liturgical orders seem largely confined 
to cloistered communities of religious specialists who, in contrast to 
Soloveitchik’s “Halakhic Man,” do not attempt to bring the divine 
into this world, but try to spend their lives partway to heaven. 
“COMMUNITAS” AND THE NUMINOUS 
We have been led out of mundane time and into the extraordinary 
time of ritual’s intervals. We earlier observed similarities, very 
general in nature, of temporal alternation in liturgical orders and in 
digital computers but also noted differences between them. Most 
significant for us is that the intervals encompassed by liturgical orders 
are, in contrast to those of computers, of sufficient duration to experi- 
ence being in them-hours or even days, rather than nanoseconds, 
in length. 
Long enough to experience being in them (I emphasize both “in,’ 
and “being”). To say that these intervals are long enough to experi- 
ence being in them is to say that they are long enough to experience 
being in them. The states of both individual consciousness and the 
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social order may be very different during ritual from those prevailing 
in mundane time. 
Participation in ritual encourages alteration of consciousness 
from the rationality that presumably prevails during daily life and, 
presumably, guides ordinary affairs toward states that, to use 
Rudolph Otto’s ([1917] 1923) term, may be called “numinous.” 
Although we do not have time here to consider the many varieties 
of numinous experience, they have in common the fact that they 
are not organized by syntactic or syllogistic logic; iconic represen- 
tation seems important in them; and they are deeply emotional. 
More specifically, numinous emotions are often reported to be 
responses to a sense of some sort of extraordinary presence in which, 
although it is sometimes conceived to be “wholly other, ” ritual 
performers may feel they are participating. Perhaps most impor- 
tant here, being directly felt) numinous experiences seem often (if 
not always) to be construed by those experiencing them to provide 
direct and undeniable evidence of such presence. 
Whereas psychiatrists might view the numinous state as disso- 
ciated, the experience (as often reported) might better be charac- 
terized as reassociated, for parts of the psyche ordinarily out of touch 
with each other may be united, or better, in light of ritual’s recurrent 
nature, reunited. Reunion, furthermore, may reach out from the 
reunited individual to embrace other members of the congregation, 
or even the cosmos as a whole. Indeed, the boundary between indi- 
viduals and their surroundings, especially others participating in 
rituals with them, may seem to dissolve. The extraordinary condition 
of mind and society that may develop during ritual has been called 
communitas. Victor Turner (1969, passim) has proposed ways in 
which the structure of relations when communitas prevails differs 
from that prevailing during mundane time, and I would add that 
the intimate, nondiscursive forms of communication, loosely called 
communing, are also characteristic of it. 
TEMPO AND COORDINATION 
I now wish to suggest that the achievement of such special states 
of mind and society in ritual is, in some instances or d e g ~ e e , ~  an 
outcome of ritual’s peculiar temporal characteristics. It is of inter- 
est, in this regard, that the reunion of “mind,” “heart,” “body,” 
and “society” may well be most fully realized in ritual dancing, as 
Radcliffe-Brown proposed long ago (1964, 251f.). In dancing, the 
whole body enters into the computations of the prevailing con- 
sciousness, at the same time that the individual’s sense of his or her 
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separation from others is submerged or overwhelmed as a function 
of continuous, tight coordination with them. Thus the communi- 
tas engendered by dancing is an outcome of heightened coordina- 
tion; and heightened coordination, in turn, may be an outcome of 
imposing upon social interaction special tempos-tempos that may 
be difficult to achieve under mundane circumstances or that are 
inappropriate to all but a very few ordinary activities. 
The tempos that are typical of such coordination are often quicker 
than tempos that are characteristic of ordinary social interaction. The 
rhythm of the drum may approximate the rapidity of heartbeats. 
That rhythm, furthermore, may entrain the breaths and pulses of the 
dancers, or at least may be experienced as if it does, as it synchronizes 
the movements of their limbs and unifies their voices into the unisons 
of chant or song. But even when tempos are not especially rapid- 
even when, for instance, the performers’ voices join in the unison of 
a slow dirge, or they kneel or rise at the same moment-their 
coordination is likely to be much tighter than is usual in mundane 
social intercourse. To sing in unison not only requires that everyone 
sing particular notes, but that they do so simultaneously. As rapidity 
has its effects, so does simultaneity. It produces unison, and in 
unison performers may experience themselves to be united with other 
congregants as parts of the order that they together realize. In an 
earlier section it was suggested that “macro-coordination” of litur- 
gical orders could effect the fusion of previously distinct groups. Now 
we note that “micro-coordination’’ of the actions of members of these 
fused congregations may unite them in communitas and further note 
that the tempos and degrees of coordination, in conformity to which 
congregations proceed through some rituals, are more characteristic of 
organic processes than of ordinary social processes. 
Some of the activities of mundane time are also rapid and 
rhythmical and tightly coordinated. It is of interest that such activi- 
ties seem to generate an esprit de corps among participants, which can 
be similar in some respects to ritual communitas. 
But tightened coordination and quickened tempo are not the only 
distinctive features of the rhythm of liturgical orders. In emphasizing 
the organic frequencies of ritual’s rhythms we must not lose sight of 
their much slower frequencies. Not only may there be repetition at 
organic frequencies within the ritual itself, but there is recurrence of 
the ritual as a whole from week to week or month to month, year to 
year, death to death. Therefore, that which is performed at a quick 
tempo and in tight coordination, and through that tempo and 
coordination unites participants more tightly than they are under 
ordinary circumstances, is experienced as never-changing. 
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ORGANIC TIME, SOCIAL TIME, AND COSMIC TIME 
We are led by these considerations to a clearer understanding of 
what may be meant by some of the mysterious phrases used to 
characterize ritual time (such phrases as “time out of time”) and 
through that understanding to conceptions of eternity. Herbert 
Simon’s discussions (1969; 1973) of temporal aspects of complex 
organization is illuminating in this regard. He argues that we can 
approach the problem of distinguishing “levels of organization” in a 
complex reality in temporal terms: 
If we observe the behavior of a system over a total time span, T, and our 
observational techniques do  not allow us to detect rhythmical or fluctuating 
changes during [brief] time intervals shorter than t,  we can break the sequence 
of characteristic frequencies into three parts: (1) low frequencies; much less 
than 1 [per] T, (2) middle-range frequencies [T<-> t], and (3) high frequencies, 
greater than 1 [per] t .  Motions . . . determined by the low frequency modes 
will be so slow that we will not observe them-they will . . . [appear to be] 
constants. 
Motions of the system determined by the high frequency modes will control 
. . . the internal interactions of the components of the lower level subsystems 
. . . but will not be involved in the interactions among those subsystems. 
Moreover, these motions will appear always to be in equilibrium. . . . In their 
relations with each other the several subsystems will behave like rigid bodies, 
so to speak (1973,9-10). 
Let us say that the middle of the three temporal regions, that which 
lies between T and t ,  is the temporal region typical of mundane social 
interaction, and let us give to T a value corresponding to a society’s 
historical memory. Among the Nuer, for instance, Evans-Pritchard 
(1940) tell us that six generations lie between the living and the first 
man. Among Polynesians, who carefully kept (and manipulated) 
genealogies, T was much longer, and of course literacy lengthens T 
by magnitudes (for Western civilization it approaches 5,000 years). 
Let us call this intermediate temporal region, within which social 
processes play themselves out over minutes, days, months, years, 
and generations, the region of social time. 
The high-frequency region, characterized by frequencies more 
rapid than t (t being as brief as a minute or a second, or even less), 
is the temporal region characteristic of transient processes internal to 
the organisms comprising the social system. It is, this is to say, the 
temporal region characteristic of highly coordinated physiological 
processes-such as breathing, the circulation of blood, the secretion 
of hormones, the reactions of nerves-and of some related psychic 
processes-such as fluctuations of emotion and attitude. Let us call 
this high- frequency region the region of organic time. 
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The low-frequency region, in which change proceeds at rates of 
less than one per T and is thus not likeb to be observed, will be taken to 
be the region of the never-changing. This is the temporal region of 
the cosmic. 
We have, in sum, distinguished three temporal regions: the 
organic, the social, and the cosmic. Ritual performance involves all 
three, I suggest, in the following way. 
First, individuals, whose obscure internal states are characterized 
by high and more or less idiosyncratic frequencies, enter into the 
ritual, thereby indicating that, despite whatever internal fluctuations 
of mood, attitude, or emotion they may be experiencing, they are, 
in Simon’s terms, stable components of the social system. In terms 
proposed at the beginning of this essay, their participation in the 
ritual indicates public and binding acceptance of the order it encodes, 
whatever internal doubts or ambivalences may be felt. 
As the ritual proceeds, however, the entire congregation, as its 
actions become more highly coordinated, moves, as a unified whole, 
back across the border, so to speak, into the organic temporal region. 
The interactions of the social unit assume temporal frequencies and degrees of 
coordination characteristic of the internal dynamics of single organisms. 
But the pattern of action specified by the liturgy’s canon is 
invariant and thus may be understood to be never-changing. A 
canon-the invariant spine of liturgical order-is of the temporal 
region characterized by temporal frequencies slower than one per 
T ,  the cosmic region. Thus, the order to which the congregation is 
at high frequency conforming is of the low-frequency region, the 
region of the apparently changeless. At one and the same moment 
the congregation moves out of social time toward both the quick and 
the eternal. “Liturgical time,” “sacred time,” “extraordinary time” 
is time out of ordinary social time. The temporal region characteristic 
of mundane social interaction is vacated in ritual. 
ORGANIC TIME AND COMMUNITAS 
A further observation of Simon’s concerning the relationship of 
frequency of interaction to bonding strength also bears upon the 
communitas prevailing during “time out of time.” He notes that, in 
nonliving matter, higher-energy, higher-frequency vibrations or 
interactions are associated with less inclusive subsystems, vibrations, 
or interactions of lower frequency, with the larger systems into which 
the subsystems are assembled. 
Thus protons and neutrons of the atomic nucleus interact strongly through 
the pion fields, which dispose of energies of some 140 million electron volts 
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each. The covalent bonds that hold molecules together, on the other hand, 
involve energies only on the order of 5 electron volts. And the bonds that 
account for the tertiary structure of large macromolecules, hence for their 
biological activity, involve energies of another order of magnitude smaller 
-around one half of an electron volt. . . . Planck’s Law prescribes a strict 
proportionality between bond energies and the associated frequencies ( 1  973, 
9f.). 
I would not wish to argue that social processes, which belong to 
the general class of informational processes, conform to Planck’s 
Law, which is concerned not with information but with energy in 
physical systems. It may be, however, that as a social group moves 
as a coordinated whole into the temporal region of the organic, its 
members may sense that they are, for the nonce, bound together as 
tightly as the cells of a single animal. It may be that the relationship 
between frequency and bonding strength in living systems, on the 
one hand, and in nonliving substances, as specified by Planck’s Law 
(or that aspect of it treated by Simon), could be subsumed by a 
formulation of such generality that it applies both to informational 
and energetic phenomena. If so, we may be approaching a principle 
in conformity to which all hierarchically structured complex systems, 
regardless of their content, must be organized. If, as Simon seems to 
suggest (1969, chap. 4), all complex systems not only may be, but 
may have to be, hierarchical in organization, it would be a funda- 
mental ordering principle. If this isn’t the case, at least we have a nice 
analogy. 
THE QUICK AND THE ETERNAL 
Let us return to the apparent paradox of a movement out of social 
time in two opposite directions simultaneously. At the beginning, 
I argued that in ritual performers fuse with the order they are 
performing. What considerations of clarity have led me to call a two- 
way movement out of the temporal region of social action is really 
not, for the quick and the eternal become one in the performers. The 
eternal is made vital as the living-that is, the quick-participate in, 
become part of, the never-changing order. And as the eternal is made 
vital, so the vital may seem to be made eternal. Intimations of 
immortality may be entailed in performances that are consonant with 
liturgy’s multitemporal rhythms, and we may be uncovering here 
experiential ground for belief in immortality, or even for the idea of 
immortality itself. 
I have, as it were, smuggled the term eternip into the discussion 
without definition. There is more than one concept of eternity, of 
course, but at least two seem intrinsic to ritual’s form. 
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The first is recurrence without end-ceaseless repetition. We may 
note, in passing, that recurrence without end may, in itself, seem to 
negate death. Van Gennep (1960, 194, passim) observed that in rites 
of passage representations of birth typically follow representations 
of death, the implication being that the rectilinear liturgical orders 
leading from birth, baptism, and naming through death are really 
not rectilinear at all but cyclical, and that physical death is followed 
by some sort of rebirth. 
If recurrence without end is one conception of eternity, it is hardly 
the only one, nor is it even self-sufficient, for recurrence is incon- 
ceivable without an assumption of changelessness. That is, for any- 
thing to recur it must be assumed to be changeless, for if it were 
not, the succeeding event could not be a recurrence of the preced- 
ing. And so there is a yet profounder sense of the eternal, not as 
endless repetition, but as the sheer successionless duration of the 
absolute changelessness of that which recurs, the successionless 
duration of that which is neither preceded nor succeeded, but which 
always was and will be. In ritual, one returns ever again to that 
which never changes, to that which is punctiliously repeated in every 
performance. 
We come face to face with another apparent paradox, that between 
the changelessness of whatever is represented in the invariant recur- 
rences of ritual and the transformations effected in the selfsame 
rituals. We are concerned here with points of articulation between 
the never-changing and ever-changing, between eternity and time. 
An image that comes to mind, perhaps brutally mechanical but 
enjoying the virtue of familiarity, is the revolving drum of a printing 
press. As the press imprints an apparently invariant message upon 
the paper passing through it, so a liturgical order imprints apparently 
invariant messages upon individual lives and upon society as a whole 
at intervals that it itself imposes upon continuous duration. 
SANCTITY AND ETERNITY 
That which is represented as never-changing varies from one society 
to the next, but in the quality of never-changingness itself we come 
close to the sacred. 
Elsewhere (1971a; 1979a, 209) I have defined sanctity as “the 
quality of unquestionableness imputed by congregations to postu- 
lates which are, in their nature, absolutely unfalsifiable and objec- 
tively unverifiable. ’’ I have argued that this unquestionableness is 
a product of ritual’s form, particularly its invariance. One ground 
of this unquestionableness was alluded to at the beginning: the 
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acceptance intrinsic to the performance of an invariant order 
encoded by others, which constitutes an agreement on the part of the 
performers not to question the order they are performing. A second 
ground, also intrinsic to invariance, follows a lead of Anthony F. C. 
Wallace (1966, 233ff.), who argued that ritual is, in terms of infor- 
mation theory, a very peculiar mode of communication. Information 
in the technical sense is understood as that which reduces uncer- 
tainty, the minimal unit being the “bit,” the information required 
to eliminate the uncertainty between two equally likely alternatives. 
To the extent that a liturgical order is invariant, it is devoid of 
information because, in the absence of alternatives, there are no 
uncertainties to eliminate. He  noted, however, that information- 
lessness is not tantamount to meaninglessness, for the meaning of 
informationlessness is certainty, and it is but a short step from 
certainty to unquestionableness. The third ground of unquestion- 
ableness is the self-evident or even undeniable nature of numinous 
experience, to the special meaningfulness of which we shall shortly 
return. 
An unbroken set of steps leads from ritual’s invariance to cer- 
tainty, acceptance, and conviction, from them to the unquestion- 
able, and from the unquestionable to its special cases-legitimacy, 
propriety, correctness, and truth. Sanctity, then, is a product of 
invariant recurrence in ritual of that which is taken to be never- 
changing. Sanctity and eternity, although not quite one and the 
same, are both generated by the performance of invariance, and as 
such are, as it were, brother and sister. That which is sacred is not 
only true but eternally true, and conversely, the eternal verities 
represented in ritual are sacred. 
TIME, ETERNITY, AND HIERARCHY 
We have been largely concerned with the part played in the con- 
struction of time and eternity by ritual’s sequential dimension. In 
touching upon eternal verities, however, we articulate with the hier- 
archical dimension of liturgical orders, which, we observed at the 
beginning, also has a temporal aspect. 
The understandings represented in liturgical orders are not merely 
heaped together. They are organized, and their organization is 
necessarily hierarchical (Simon 1969, chap. 4). At the apex are 
expressions that we may call ultimate sacred postulates. These verities, 
taken to be forever true, and exemplified by Christian creeds and 
the Shema of the Jews, are the apparent sources from which sanctity 
flows through corpora of discourse, sanctifying sentences of lower 
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order. These include, at the next level, “cosmological axioms” 
expressing general structural principles in accordance with which the 
universe is organized. More specific rules for realizing these prin- 
ciples in action are of lower order and are less sanctified than are 
cosmological axioms. Information concerning current states of the 
mundane world is sanctified as it enters liturgically organized dis- 
course at yet lower levels. It is in response to such information, 
concerning fluctuating and transient states of social, political, and 
environmental conditions, that rules conforming to cosmic ordering 
principles, sanctified by ultimate sacred postulates, are invoked and 
acted upon (Rappaport 1979c, esp. 117-26). 
We observe that in the descent from ultimate sacred postulates we 
descend from the eternal, fundamental, immutable, nonmaterial, 
nonspecific, and sacred to the ephemeral, instrumental, changeable, 
concrete, specific, and mundane. The temporal structure of this 
hierarchy has profound implications for orderly adaptive processes, 
about which I have written at length elsewhere (Rappaport 1978; 
1979d; 1984). 
LEVELS OF MEANING 
A special form of meaning or meaningfulness is associated with the 
state of being prevailing when the quick and the eternal are fused in 
ritual. 
We may, in a rough-and-ready way, distinguish three “levels” 
or “types” of meaning.4 First, there is what may be called low- 
order meaning) the semantic meaning of everyday. If it is not coexten- 
sive with what is meant by “information” in information theory, 
it is close to it, for it is grounded in distinction: the meaning of dog is 
dog, which is distinct from cat, which is designated by cat. The 
paradigmatic form for the organization of low-order meaning is 
taxonomy. 
Whereas distinction is the ground of low-order meaning, there 
is a higher-order meaning) based not upon distinction but upon the 
recognition of similarities hidden beneath the differences distinguishing 
apparently disparate things. If taxonomy provides a paradigm for 
low-order meaning, metaphor does so for higher-order meaning. 
Higher-order meaning, typically condensed into single metaphors, 
is much lower in information in the technical sense than is low- 
order meaning generated by ever-multiplying distinctions. We have 
seen, however, that information and meaning are not one and the 
same, and higher-order meaning, possibly because it is based in 
some degree upon nondiscursive pattern recognition, seems more 
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affect-laden, more “meaningful, ” than does low-order meaning. It 
is not surprising that the multivocal representations of ritual are 
meaningful in this higher-order way. 
But not only in this way, for there is also what may be called highest- 
order meaning that is based upon neither distinction nor similarity but 
unity, the unification of that  which is meaningful with those for  whom it is 
meaningful. If taxonomy is the house of low-order meaning and if 
metaphor is the vehicle of higher-order meaning, then participation, 
particularly in ritual, is the way to highest-order meaning. Whereas 
low-order meaning is highly objective, highest-order meaning seems 
absolutely subjective, for in it distinctions between objects and 
subjects are dissolved. To the extent that participation in ritual 
annihilates distinctions, it is itself devoid of information, and we are 
faced with the possibility that information is the antithesis of the most 
meaningful of all meanings. Be this as it may, one grasps (or is 
grasped by) highest-order meaning by participating in-that is, 
becoming part of-that which is meaningful, as in the performance 
of a liturgical order. Highest-order meaning is not referential, but a state of 
being. It is this state of being that may enliven the eternal and sacred 
in some ritual performances, and may, in turn, engender a sense of 
the divine. 
HISTORY AND NUMBER 
We can ask, at the end, whether the recording of history may not be 
eternity’s enemy. Written history expands the scope of T, taken to 
be a society’s historical memory, from a few generations to thousands 
of years, thus letting us know that more and more of that which the 
nonliterate takes to be never-changing is, in fact, changing, albeit at 
rates or frequencies imperceptible in single lifetimes or even in the 
course of a few generations. 
The numbering of years and days, and finally minutes and 
seconds, may also threaten eternity, even when the succession of the 
enumerated periods extends beyond imagining. If time is numbered, 
we can no longer escape its undoing by entering ritual’s eternity even 
for a little while, for when we return we can hardly avoid knowing 
that our sojourn in ritual lasted for, let us say, an hour and a half 
on a certain day of a certain month in a certain year. Endless time 
not only is not eternity but overwhelms eternity, reducing it to 
insignificance or to superstition. When moments of eternity are fully 
encompassed by a time that moves inexorably toward entropy, the 
intimations of immortality experienced in them are likely to seem no 
more than illusions, and eternity’s only plausible resting place 
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becomes an increasingly dubious hereafter. Number gives eternity, 
which once informed life and was infused by it, into the hands of 
death. We are left to the terrors of history (Eliade 1957) as the eternal 
is banished from life by the merely innumerable. 
NOTES 
1. That there is no obligation in the absence of acceptance is the strong form of the 
argument. A qualification of the strong form would recognize that a person may be 
obligated by acceptance on his or her behalf by a proper agent; for example, a child may 
be bound to conformity to the rules of a particular church as a consequence of its parents 
having it baptized. A weak form of the argument would hold that although an act of 
acceptance indubitably entails obligation and is likely to specify the nature of that 
obligation more or less precisely, obligation can exist in the absence of acceptance, some 
obligations (e.g., human mothers’ care of their infants) even being “natural.” 
It should be clear that there is a distinction between obligafion, which is moral in nature, 
and legal responsibiliv or culpabiliv, which can be decreed in the absence of acceptance. 
2. The Logos in Heracleitus is the principle, at once rational and moral, underlying 
or even constituting the world’s general order. Although concealed, it is accessible, 
through effort, to human understanding because the human mind, as part of the world, 
is organized by the same Logos as the world as a whole (see Kahn 1979; Kirk 1954). 
3. Other aspects of ritual may, of course, also contribute to these special states. 
4. Since completing this article, I have been informed by Michael R .  Jackson that he 
has adopted a taxonomy of codes from the work of the psychoanalyst Harry Stack 
Sullivan (1953) that seems to correspond to these three levels of meaning. Synfaxic codes, 
which are “logical in structure and univocal in content,” correspond to what I am calling 
higher-order meaning; profofaxic codes, “nonlogical in structure and radically ambiguous 
in content,” correspond to highest-order meaning Uackson, in press). 
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